Apple vs the FBI Part I

Introduction and Background

This post is an attempt to explain the encryption dispute between Apple and the FBI. It will provide general background on the whole so-called “security vs privacy” debate, historical context of how the United States government has interacted with encryption, and finally talk about the events leading up to and the actual dispute between Apple and the FBI regarding unlocking an iPhone 5c, used by one of the San Bernardino shooters.

Since I started writing this post, a lot of new developments have transpired in the dispute. Most notably, the FBI has decided to drop the case against Apple, and obtain the information they need through other means. This probably means they realized they could not possibly win in court, and did not want to risk losing the power of the All Writs Act of 1789.

Security vs Privacy

The government and the media like to set up a dichotomy between privacy and security, often asking how much we should give up privacy for the sake of security. They will say this when talking about encryption and other computer security measures, as an argument for weakening encryption or adding required back doors.

This, in fact, is a false dichotomy. Security and privacy go hand-in-hand, and only in the edge cases is there tension between the two. For example, the same privacy tools that protect your Facebook account also protect your bank account info. These same privacy tools provide security equally to journalists and politicians, who rely on encrypted communication to protect themselves and their employer from adversaries, both foreign or domestic.

Backed doored encryption?

Some politicians believe it is possible to create electric security measures that have a back door that only allows good law enforcement in. I choose to think that this belief is due to ignorance of technology, not malicious intent to weaken everybody’s security. Some politicians and reporters have said that we should not listen to the people who say “good” back doors are impossible, because if we always listened to people who said something was impossible, when would humanity every accomplish anything?

However, in this case almost everyone who even vaguely knows what they are talking about have said safe back doors are impossible.

A (not so) brief interlude on back doors: what some people are advocating is either some sort of “golden key” or universal code that can decrypt all encryption, or banning encryption that the US Government does not have the capability of breaking. The FBI, NSA, or some other “trusted” agency would keep hold of the key, and only use it to open the back door when it is most needed. There are a several issues with this. First, if the government bans encryption they cannot break, they they will have banned encryption that their enemies cannot break, giving enemies of the United States the ability to read all encrypted communications from the United States. Second, the idea of a “golden key” does not work, since as soon as the key becomes widely used it will be leaked or stolen, rendering all encryption useless.

There is also a practical problem with any restrictions on encryption: it would be impossible to impose on open source software. There already exists software that provides strong, unbreakable encryption. Any attempts to weaken this strength will be immediately noticed and undone.

To conclude my discussion of encryption: back doored encryption is probably impossible to do correctly, and even legislation could be circumvented by existing software.

The Clipper Chip

Unknown to many, we had this same debate in the 1990s, dubbed the “Crypto Wars”. An important part of this was the Clipper Chip, a chip developed by the NSA to provide a back door for the US government to cell phone communications. The idea was that the cell phone encryption would go through the Clipper Chip, which had a built in back door code that only the NSA knew. Unfortunately (or fortunately, for many), researchers quickly found multiple flaws in the design and implementation of the chip (read the Wikipedia page for more information on those), which was essentially the end of the crypto wars (in favor of technologists, against the government).

Apple vs the FBI

And finally, on to the main show: Apple vs the FBI.

This whole issue started with the San Bernardino attack in December 2015. After the attack, law enforcement found the work phone of one of the attackers, an iPhone 5c.

The county made a rather large mistake by reseting the iCloud password for the account associated with this phone, preventing any future iCloud backups until the phone is unlocked. If they had not done this, law enforcement would only have to connect the phone to a trusted wifi network (by bringing it within range of the network), and it would have uploaded all its data to iCloud, where law enforcement could have accessed the information via a warrant sent to Apple.

However, this was not possible, so the FBI had to find a way to unlock the phone. Unfortunately for the FBI, the phone was set up to wipe itself if 10 incorrect passcodes are attempted, preventing attempts to brute force the passcode (that is, trying all of them until one works). They decided to use the All Writs Act of 1789, which authorizes US Federal Courts to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law”, to obtain a court order to compel Apple to create software that would both disable the 10 passcode limit and allow the FBI to try passcodes via a USB connection.

Rather than rolling over and complying, as many companies do, Apple decided to fight the order in court. This generated quite a bit of publicity, until the FBI decided to back down, withdraw their case, and claim they found an easier way to get into the phone.

Easier ways had been suggested since the case first went public, as compelling Apple to write new software is very heavy handed, and likely illegal. What the FBI most likely will do is copy the contents of the flash chip, and then either break the filesystem encryption, or try codes on the phone until it wipes the data, copy the data back, and then try again. This would take a while, but since there are only 10,000 4 digit codes, it would only take 1000 attempt-wipe-reload-try again cycles.

The FBI probably could have done that in the beginning (or paid another company to do so), but they wanted to set a precedent that the government can compel companies to write code under the All Writs Act.

Why this is bad, in brief

While it seems clear to me why the FBI’s request was bad, I should explain for anyone who has not yet decided. The main arguments are that it sets a precedent, both domestically and internationally, that tech companies and Apple specifically can be forced to circumvent their own security measures; it forces Apple to create software that cannot be uncreated, and will be dangerous in the future; and that compelling a company to write code violates the first amendment in the Bill of Rights.

The first two are rather self explanatory. If the US government compels Apple to write software to disable security features on their phones, however good the reason, other countries can do the same for less noble purposes. Additionally, once Apple writes this software, it is out there, and could be leaked to bad actors.

In 1996, The Ninth Circuit Court of the United States ruled that code is speech, and should be protected under the first amendment. By issuing an order forcing Apple to write an update for their operating system, the court is in direct violation of this. This is probably the most damning piece for the government’s case, considering the importance of the first amendment in American law.

Even ignoring the legal and practical problems with the FBI’s request, there are also moral difficulties to contend with. These are obvious to anyone who already has issue with pervasive government surveillance. To anyone else, this is exactly the kind of precedent the government needs to later unlock the private data of citizens, journalists, and other politicians. Even in the United States, the Land of the Free, the government has a habit of spying on foreign and domestic politicians, activists, and normal citizens. The last thing the government needs is the ability to access sensitive data that those people specifically worked to keep private.


In response to Apple’s refusal to follow the initial court order, many politicians have come down on either side. Notably, Senator (and previous presidential candidate) Lindsey Graham has switched sides after actually talking to technology experts about the technical details of the case. Some lawmakers, rather disturbingly, have used this as a reason to call for limits on encryption and laws requiring back doors.


I hope this was a helpful overview of the issues at hand with encryption, privacy and security, and the encryption dispute between Apple and the FBI.

These questions, which were previously explored in th 1990s, have been thrust back into public view, and debates are re-igniting over to what extent the government should regulate technology. After reading this, I hope you are able to make a more informed opinion on these issues, and see why government regulation of encryption may be ineffective or even dangerous.

This post was mostly aimed at non-technical users of technology. My next blog post will likely be a call to arms for technologists to fight against government limits on encryption and government surveillance.